Traffic Culture: Law, Morality and Actual Behaviour by Jørgensen, Anette Jerup
 Traffic Culture: Law, Morality and Actual Behaviour 
 
PhD student Anette Jerup Jørgensen 
Institute of Sociology, Social Work and Organisation 
Aalborg University, Denmark 
E-mail: jerup@socsci.aau.dk 
 
Abstract 
This paper is about culture of automobility and is based on a qualitative and quantitative enquiry carried 
out in Northern Jutland, Denmark 2005. The paper presents information about traffic culture in 
Denmark, theoretical and methodological reflections on traffic safety. The purpose of the paper is to 
present a sociological view of the Danish traffic culture and it is constructed around three basic 
issues. The first is how drivers relate to legal standards and moral norms in traffic. The second the 
possibilities and constraints of legal standards and moral norms to regulate the behaviour of drivers and 
the final issue is how this influence the risk of traffic accidents among drivers. Since most accidents 
occur with two or more drivers it is important to bring attention to social patterns of interaction and the 
ability of normative practises to regulate the behaviour of drivers. It is an almost absent perspective in 
current research concerning traffic safety.  
 
 
Pronouncements about the Danish Traffic Culture  
Since the mid-nineties there has been a fierce debate in the media and in the population about 
Danish drivers being egoistic, ruthless, and self-opinionated when interacting in traffic. Both 
representatives from rescuers, road menders and traffic police describe the traffic culture as a war of 
everyone against everyone else, where everyone demands one’s rights and if someone tries to elbow 
past it is perceived as an intervention against the driver’s personal freedom (Allingstrup 2002, 8; 
Jensen 2002).  
 
Often the alleged increasing problem with drivers being egoistic, ruthless and self-opinionated is 
assumed to increase the probability of severe traffic accidents (Lang 2003). There is, however, no 
scientific evidence of a correlation between the increase in egoistic behaviour and the number of 
accidents because while the drivers are supposed to have become more egoistic, ruthless, and self-
opinionated, the accident rate has decreased and has not been lower since the end of the forties. The 
argumentation in the media can therefore be seen as counter-factual morality with the objective to 
denounce deviants in order to maintain social order (Tonboe 1997, 68). But the question is what 
values and norms are regulating driver behaviour? Studies of interaction and moral norms in the 
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 traffic cultures are almost nonexistent and it is therefore an interesting field to investigate from a 
sociological point of view.  
 
Focus  
The main purpose of this study is to present a sociological view of the Danish traffic culture by 
elucidating in what way morality can be used to regulate driver behaviour according to other ways 
of regulation. In order to do that, the relation between law, morality, and actual behaviour has been 
examined. More specifically the study answers the following questions: 
 
1. What moral norms do exist about interaction among drivers and how is the relation between 
law and morality? 
 
2. What influence does law and morality have for the drivers individual strategies in 
interaction? 
 
3. In case of drivers’ deviance, do they legitimise their actions and if so – how do they 
legitimise it? 
 
In reference to the first question, I have examined the relation between law and morality. At first 
sight I expected a certain consistency between law and morality. For instance the drivers can agree 
that one ought to be considerate when interacting with others in traffic. But the perception of 
consideration can vary in different situations, different periods of time and according to whom is 
interacting. We are all equal in compliance to the law, but morally there can be a difference 
between the rights drivers have, take and are given in interaction. 
 
In the case of the second question, I have examined whether drivers actual strategies for actions 
commensurate with moral interaction norms. Drivers do not necessarily maintain these norms when 
in traffic or consider it to be in their own interest to do so. Therefore, I presumed that drivers’ 
deviances from law and morality takes place to higher or lesser extend and that their actions are 
more or less normatively regulated. However, deviance from the law would not necessarily be 
perceived as morally unacceptable.  
 
This leads to the third question by which I have examined the drivers’ strategies for legitimising 
deviance. I presumed that a deviation from the law could be morally acceptable and consequently it 
would not be exposed to condemnation unlike deviances from moral norms that are perceived as 
illegitimate egoistic action. I assumed that the illegitimate actions would take place due to the fact 
that interaction in traffic is mostly anonymous and the risk of being subjected to social sanctions in 
traffic is almost nonexistent. As a consequence the drivers can act in a more egoistic manner when 
interacting in traffic in difference to other social relationships.  
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 Methodology  
In order to illuminate the research questions I have used a triangulation of methods including filmic 
observation of actual driver behaviour, quantitative questionnaires to drivers, and focus group 
interviews with both drivers and driving instructors. The different data sources have supplemented 
and validated one another, whereby the relation between laws, moral, and actual behaviour in 
driving culture has been elucidated to best effect.  
 
The questionnaire contains questions about how the respondent believes one ought to behave in 
interaction, how he/she perceives others actions and specifications about the respondents own 
typical actions when interacting in traffic. The questionnaire has been send to a stratified selection 
of 200 drivers in the age 18-73 years selected by the central register of motor vehicles – half of the 
respondents, where men and half of them women. First, the questionnaire has given an impression 
of driver’s attitudes and actions. Secondly, the questionnaire has been used as criteria for selecting 
participants to the two following focus group interviews with eight drivers in each group. The 
drivers have been selected in a way that insured that the participants were as different as possible. 
Beside the two focus group interviews with drivers I have had one with the driving instructors.  
 
In order to kick-start the discussion with the groups I made a six hour-long film with different 
traffic situations. On the basis of the raw film I have selected three different situations involving 
actions that in the media are described as egoistic, ruthless and self-opinionated. The advantage of 
using images of concrete interaction is that it makes it easier to avoid obvious statements such as; 
we should all be considerate towards one another. By discussing specific actions it has been 
possible to capture variations in the normative praxis and the justifications drivers use for their 
actual behaviour. 
 
In regards to the practical use of the methods there are some issues worth mentioning – issues that 
affect the validity and reliability of the study. On the one hand, the triangulation of methods has 
contributed to an improvement of the validity because the different kind of data sources has made it 
possible to correct information. In many cases it has been possible to answer the research questions 
using several different sources so that the likelihood of accuracy in the findings is higher. Even 
though the triangulation of methods has been successful there are issues in relation to the 
questionnaire that reduces the validity of conclusions about background variables affecting drivers’ 
actual actions.  
 
First, the extent of the questionnaire is too limited to uncover all questions relevant to answering the 
research questions adequately. Secondly, the quantitative analyses are only based on 101 
questionnaires. The drop-out rate is very significant and the representativity of the questionnaire 
analyses can therefore be called into question. Furthermore, the stratified selection of drivers has 
not subsequently been weighted with reference to the actual population because that possibility was 
not available. This creates further uncertainty about the representativity of the questionnaire survey. 
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 The conclusions about background variables affecting differentiated strategies of action must 
therefore be considered as the Achilles heel of the inquiry because the tendencies in the 
questionnaire can deviate from reality. For this reason I am only referring to tendencies to 
differentiation in strategies of action in reference to drivers’ actual behaviour. As distinct from the 
uncertainty about the differentiation of action strategies there is a solid empirical material 
documenting the drivers’ moral norms and the relation between legal standards and moral 
obligations.  
 
Theoretical Perspectives 
In order to make the research questions more clear it has been helpful to include sociological theory 
about the structural conditions (macro) affecting drivers’ norms and actions as well as specific 
theory about how individuals and groups interact (micro) and how they in their interaction chooses 
to adhere to common norms ore not. Only by including both levels of analysis the relation between 
norm and deviation in the traffic culture has been sufficiently illustrated.   
 
In order to achieve an all-embracing theoretical framework that explains norm and deviance, I have 
employed an eclectic approach that inevitably encompasses classical sociological discussions of 
conflict and consensus, reproduction and change. Theories about change in the late modernity 
emphasise individuals’ liberation from previous constraints. A liberation entailing that tradition is 
no longer accepted unless it makes sense to the individual. It does not mean that communities 
disappear. Instead norms are constantly developing on grounds of communicative action in which 
drivers negotiate meaning and agree on what norms should guide actions.  
 
In contrast to the theories of change, the theories of reproduction stresses that even though late 
modernity is changing there is still classical structural constraints that affect individuals ability to 
determine what norms are legitimate and their ability to get their way when interacting with others. 
Both perspectives are represented in the theoretical framework, but the perspective of change is 
emphasised.  
Late Modern Societies 
Due to the fact that development trends in late modernity affect drivers’ norms and actions, theories 
about late modernity constitute the theoretical framework of the study. According to Anthony 
Giddens the social actions is unlocked from earlier local constraints which include a separation of 
time and space. As regards to this separation of time and space, the demand for geographical 
mobility has increased (Juul 2002; Giddens 1994; Giddens 1996). This has also influenced the 
development of the modern city in terms of a range of measures to increase individual mobility 
(Hjorthol and Lian 2004, 1). 
 
Annual Transport Conference at Aalborg University 2006 
Per Reviewed        ISSN 1397-3169 4
 The creation of the automobile can be seen as an effect of the demand to increase mobility, that 
combined with an individualisation process in society and a technological development has 
established the automobile as a cultural, social and technological product. Usage of the automobile 
increases the speed of travel and makes it possible for humans to arrive at their destination faster 
than if they were walking (Beckmann 2001, 37). Hence, time is a central dimension when moving 
from one geographical space to another (Hjorthol and Lian 2004, 4). In addition to this, the 
development of an abstract, divisible and universally measurable time has become an important 
characteristic for industrialized capitalist societies (Urry 2000, 108).   
 
With the introduction of time as regards to paid work, time has become a commodity which can be 
bought and sold (Hjorthol 2001, 39). Time is money and waste of time is a waste of money. 
Therefore individuals ought to be thrifty with time, not waste it, use it to the fullest and govern their 
own and others time with due diligence (Urry 2000, 109; Frönes 2001, 70). Furthermore, waiting 
time becomes a subjectively endured event in the automobile, which is an experience that primarily 
gives negative associations (Hjorthol 2001, 40; Hjorthol and Lian 2004, 4). Since time is both an 
individual and a common interest and the individual driver’s use of time affect others in traffic 
interactions, the perception of time in late modernity play and important role influencing both 
norms and actions in the Danish traffic culture.  
Automobility as a Risky Social Praxis 
The symbolic meaning associated with the automobile also affects norm and action. Automobility 
as a phenomenon is usually associated with freedom; it is possible to go wherever you want, when 
you want (Zeitler 1998, 30). The automobile is even described as the mechanical embodiment of 
personal freedom (Hagman 2003, 3). However, this personal freedom is loaded with constraints. 
Physically – because the construction of the car limits the drivers’ room for manoeuvre (Otnes 
1994, 12). Morally – because almost everyone chooses individual transport, which creates a new 
institutionalised social praxis, where everyone is locked in a traffic jam and no one achieves the 
expected freedom (Beckmann 2001, 48-49, Beckmann 2002, 85). The freedom of the automobile 
and the promise of increased mobility can therefore be considered as an illusion. We try to obtain it, 
but it is unattainable. 
 
Also the risk of road accidents constrains drivers’ individual freedom of action. According to Ulrik 
Bech, risks in late modernity are human made and are unavoidable for all individuals no matter how 
much they try to avoid it – even if the responsibility is placed on individuals that challenge the 
moral and physical boundaries (Beck 1997). However risks can be changed, reduced, increased, 
dramatised or played down within the scope of the knowledge that exists about them. Besides being 
objectively measurable – risks are being used morally to define the boundaries for individual 
freedom of action as a way of maintaining an individualistic culture (Douglas 1985; Douglas 1992, 
28). By the moral use of (objective) risks drivers constrain each others freedom because even 
though drivers pursue maximal individual freedom everyone are more or less aware that the road to 
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 improving and securing their own conditions goes through regulating others actions, which also 
imply obligations towards others (Tonboe 1997, 74). The rights and obligations which exist in 
traffic are defined by means of law and morality.  
Law and Morality 
In the modern understanding of law individual rights play an important role. Within the boundaries 
of the law every individual has the same liberties and can use their own free will which makes the 
modern law well suited for social integration in differentiated societies (Habermas 1975, 95; 
Habermas 1996, 82-84). However the legal order is only legitimate if it does not contrast with basic 
moral principles (Habermas 1996, 106; Habermas 1997, 353). In consequence the legal norms 
depend upon gaining moral recognition among the drivers.  
 
Additionally, individuals act on the basis of reflexivity in a modern society and thus the respect for 
legal and moral norms only exist, when individuals think the established norms are worthy of 
respect (Andersen 1998, 307). In principle, we can agree that one must play by the legal rules but in 
specific situations individuals act in view of reflexivity and negotiate the legal order morally 
(Andersen 1998, 395). Consequently, a number of moral arguments that legitimise so-called 
insignificant violations of legal norms are under development. On the one hand it can pose 
problems if drivers do not acknowledge and maintain legal order, but on the other hand it can also 
pose problems if drivers maintain legal order without considering moral obligations when 
interacting in traffic. That would be perceived as self-opinionated behaviour.  
The Demarcation between Liberty of Action and Egocentrism   
The fact that drivers’ negotiate the law sometimes undermines the legitimacy of the law. Though in 
an individualised society there is a need for individual autonomy and liberty of action in order for 
the individual to remain capable of surviving and creating his or her own life, it does not necessarily 
result in the erosion of communities because it also includes cohesion and reciprocity. The modern 
man is trying to combine self-realization with being for others, so that individualism is not 
incompatible with altruism (Giddens 1994, 13; Knudsen 1999, 9). To act strategically is not 
necessarily incompatible with communicative action. One can strive for own purposes and interests 
within the boundaries of morally obligating norms and it would be considered as the individual 
freedom of action. As long as ones actions makes it possible for other drivers to obtain their 
interests and goal, the action will not be condemned. But if the individuals actions constrain the 
opportunity for development of others, the action will be perceived as egoistic. Hence, the line 
between egoistic behaviour and individual freedom of action is a delicate balance. 
  
In order for everyone to obtain their own interests within the boundaries of moral norms, there is a 
set of coping strategies that gives guidance to drivers in order for their actions not to be at the 
expense of others. These techniques are established in order to avoid the risks associated with road 
traffic interaction and maintain social order. Erwin Goffman mentions several techniques such as 
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 the first-served basis and the principle of equality (Goffman 2004, 168, 313-314). In traffic the first-
served basis means that the one who arrives first has the right to pass first. The principle of equality 
stresses e.g. in the case of queue in traffic that one has the right to move forward right after the 
person in front and before the driver at the rear. In spite of principles of equality there can be 
exceptional circumstances, where this principle is disregarded. For example if and elderly person 
accidentally fail to observe that two roads narrow down to one and resultingly drives to far ahead, 
the other drivers can use more far-reaching strategies that involve a kind of “noblesse oblige” by 
which the elderly driver is let in (Goffman 2004, 318).  
Communicative Action 
The decision about how one ought to interact in traffic is made in the communicative action in 
which the boundaries for individual freedom of action are determined. Drivers make use of their 
reflexive approach to negotiate which whether or not actions can be considered legitimate. When 
drivers reach an agreement given the reflexive negotiation, the action will be considered morally 
acceptable. However, the reflexivity unfortunately can prove to pose problems for the 
communicative action because the boundary between reflexivity and anomie can be gradual. 
Reflexivity can lead us into slippery ground, so that it causes a sophisticated post-rationalisation 
and legitimising of quite cynical and egoistic behaviour without consideration for the community 
rather than greater responsibility (Andersen 1998, 59).  
 
Additionally, the communicative action can not always be considered as a result of total agreement. 
In a complex modern society some groups or individuals can have the power to dictate the terms in 
shape of compromises (Habermas 1975, 116-118). According to Goffman, the will to accept a given 
order can be contingent upon the harsh fact about ones own position in the social structure 
(Goffman 2004, 292).    
 
In traffic, the communicative action among drivers is primarily non-verbal, but it can be verbalised 
both in and out of the interaction in traffic. Two different perspectives exist about drivers’ 
communication in traffic. One stresses the constrained communications options: drivers being 
distant from each other with few means to understand one another (Otnes 1994, 26-27; Featherstone 
2004, 12; Thrift 2004, 47-48). The other one stresses that the automobile involves new ways of 
communicating, where the driver uses his/her own body as well as the automobile to communicate 
with. In that perspective the automobile establishes new ways of communicating by use of for 
example mirrors and windows (Featherstone 2004, 8, 12).  
 
According to Thyra Uth Thomsen the automobile also contributes to the symbolic communication 
between drivers, so that the automobile does not just refer to the user of the car, but also to common 
meaning for the individual and the community (Thomsen 2003, 160, 240). Due to this view, it is 
possible to speak of communicative actions in traffic. At first sight the communicative action 
appears to be constructive, but unfortunately sometimes it can be a cover for systematically 
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 distorted communication, if people give the impression of acting communicatively but in reality 
acts egoistically (Habermas 1997, 119, 264; Outhwaite 1997, 54). Even though it is in the 
individuals’ interest that others maintain moral norms, it is not necessarily in their own interest to 
maintain all details themselves (Goffman 2004, 292). Ulli Zeitler describes this as the commuter’s 
dilemma (Zeitler 1998). 
Deviance and Legitimising Strategies 
Whether an action is considered to be egoistic also depends on how the community of drivers reacts 
to a deviance. It is only if other persons perceive an action as problematic and condemn it that it is 
perceived as an egocentric behaviour (Becker 1973, 22-25).  
 
Different kinds of deviance exist. Some of them can be defined as secret, which refers to deviance 
that does not result in condemnation from other drivers, either because the deviance is not 
discovered or because the driver uses neutralisation techniques to legitimise his or her actions. 
Neutralisation techniques use specific situations as a starting point and the explanation of the 
situation serve to contribute to the legitimatising of the act (Frönes 2001, 93). On the basis of 
neutralising techniques the definition of norm and deviance in traffic becomes a reflexive 
negotiation about what is right and wrong. In an individualised society there is a relatively large 
grey area, where deviance under certain conditions and in specific situations can be justified 
reflexively and therefore be considered legitimate. It is in the negotiations of right and wrong that 
the moral norms develop and changes, as the boundaries for legitimate actions in traffic convert.   
Conclusion and Discussion   
At a basic level the most important moral norm in traffic is maximal mobility for the community. 
The perception among drivers are that time is limited and therefore time must be used with due 
diligence, so that one’s own and others time is not wasted. One shall not cause inconvenience for 
other drivers and restrain their mobility. In order to maximise the efficiency of traffic interactions 
one ought to show one’s intentions to others, so that they can allow for one’s action strategies in the 
transient interaction.  
 
Another basic moral norm is that one should be considerate towards others. But this is a moral norm 
that can be disregarded if some drivers detain others in their pass-ability. In these cases the mobility 
of the community is more important than the consideration towards the drivers whom are less 
mobile than the community. The individual driver’s mobility shall not cause inconvenience to the 
community in any way. Nor is it acceptable to try to maximise one’s mobility at the expense of 
others. 
 
Beside these basic norms the drivers also construct specific situational dependent moral norms that 
to a greater or lesser extend is tied to the highway code. It is actually difficult to conclude without 
ambiguity because the relation between legal and moral norms is complex. When the moral norms 
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 are interconnected with the law, both sets of standards are regulating behaviour. This is the case 
when it comes to violations of traffic safety distances on the motorway. If this highway code is not 
followed, the drivers perceive it as being a risk to the community of drivers. In this case the 
highway code functions as codified morality that constrains drivers’ actions in view of objective 
risks. The objective risks are embedded in the highway code and is used morally to legitimise 
constraints in the individual driver’s freedom of action.  
 
However, when there is a conflict between moral norms and legal norms because the legal norms 
can be used for egoistic purposes, the legal norms loses their legitimacy and do no longer serve as a 
guide for drivers’ actions. For instance when two traffic lanes narrows down to one. In these 
situations drivers disregard the highway code to a greater or lesser extend because the highway code 
conflicts with some of the drivers coping strategies such as the principle of equality and the first-
served basis. The reason why drivers disregard the highway code is that it can be used for 
egocentric purposes when some drivers utilise the law to jump the queue in order to achieve own 
mobility at the expense of others. 
  
The situation where two traffic lanes narrows down to one is also interesting from another 
perspective. Qua the law all drivers have equal rights and obligations, but morally the drivers 
differentiate rights and obligations in traffic interaction. Some distinct drivers and drivers in distinct 
automobiles are in spite of the moral unacceptability not attributed egoistic attentions when jumping 
the queue. If emergency vehicles, police vehicles, a trainer car or elderly drivers jumps the queue, 
other drivers believe one ought to let them in as a kind of “noblesse obligé”.  
The Potential Situational Egocentrism 
Even though drivers in general have high moral standards and are very conscious of how they 
should and ought to behave in interaction, most drivers deviate from intersubjectively recognised 
norms to a greater or lesser extent. Almost all drivers disregard collective norms from time to time, 
most often for example when driving from home to work or when picking up children from school, 
which in both cases take place in rush hour traffic. This is a situation that the drivers associate with 
stress and time pressure. Even the consideration for particular groups can be disregarded in the 
rush-hour traffic. The consequence is that almost every driver is potentially behaving in a situation-
specifically egoistic manner, in the period of time, where most accidents occur. 
The Universe of Legitimised Deviance 
Beside the deviations that are characterised as egocentric there is a great part of deviations that is 
legitimised in the communicative action by use of legitimising techniques. The lack of 
condemnation is a result of reflexive negotiation with which drivers use excuses to neutralize their 
deviant behaviour in a way that is acceptable to the community of drivers. For instance when it 
comes to driving in the emergency lane; morally it is not acceptable. Even so some drivers negotiate 
this constraint reflexively and succeed in legitimising emergency lane driving in specific situations.  
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 For instance if the queue occurs because of bad weather instead of a traffic accident, if another one 
shows the way or if there is only 50 metres to the motorway spur it is acceptable to drive in the 
emergency lane.  
 
It is not only in association with emergency lanes that drivers legitimise deviations. It is a general 
tendency. Most of the time drivers agree on what constitute legitimate and illegitimate deviations, 
but in one case the participants disagree. If one drives in the fast lane on the freeway with the speed 
required by law, men and women have different attitudes as to whether it is acceptable or not to 
violate the safety distance in order to sanction the driver for keeping the others from passing at a 
higher speed. Among the female drivers it is perceived as unacceptable to violate the safety 
distances required by law, but they have difficulties getting their way with the male participants. If 
the driver (often a woman) will not drive faster, she should (according to the male participants) 
resign to the nearside lane so that the drivers who want to drive faster can proceed. If the slow 
driver is not resigning to the nearside lane, it can be acceptable to sanction this behaviour by 
violating traffic safety distances. The disagreement also reflect itself in the actual interaction, where 
women to a greater extend than men endures others driving to close behind them in the fast lane and 
men as well as women believe that it is men who practice this sanctioning. It seems that there are 
differentiations in power due to gender, where men have a greater success in dictating the moral 
standard in the traffic culture than women. Whatever the circumstances are; when the violation of 
safety distances required by law is legitimised, it is a safety problem in an objective sense.  
Reflexivity or anomie 
Positively, the reflexive orientation is a way of developing culture in an individualised society so 
that the moral norms adapt to modern individualistic ways of living, but on the other hand, it can 
also be used to legitimise true egoistic behaviour so instead of developing moral standards, it is 
weakening it. A good example of this is intersections controlled by traffic lights when the traffic 
light shifts from green to yellow. According to the highway code one must leave the intersection 
before it shifts to green from the crossing side. In case of a yellow light one must brake if possible 
unless it is associated with danger to do so. Morally, the drivers negotiate the law and agree that it is 
acceptable to speed up at yellow light if it is a late night with full overview of the intersection and 
there is no other road users nearby, if the light has just shifted from green to yellow, if the light at 
the pedestrian crossing has just shifted to red, if a driver from behind is too close and braking would 
result in a collision or if it as a herd mentality. As long as ones actions do not disregard the 
consideration for others mobility and safety, drivers agree that it is morally acceptable. 
Unfortunately, some of the legitimised deviations can be a cover for egocentric behaviour. 
According to the driving instructors speeding up because of a driver behind being to close is a poor 
excuse drivers use in order to maximise their own mobility at the expense of other road users in 
their presence. 
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 Even though the reflexive negotiation tendency is prevalent, some drivers use negotiations more 
than others. Male drivers have a tendency to negotiate legal standards more than women, just as 
young people have a tendency to negotiate more than elders. The negotiation can also be affected 
by the drivers’ education, but it is only a vague tendency. It is surprising that the effect of education 
is weak. One explanation could be that education has less effect in traffic. But it is also possible that 
the reason should be found in the uncertainty of the questionnaire survey that only contribute with 
conclusions on a flimsy ground. Further studies are needed in order to achieve a sufficient 
knowledge of the background variables affecting both moral and strategies for actions in traffic.  
 
Even though there is a great deal of the drivers’ actions which can be legitimised in the 
communicative action as mentioned before there are deviations impossible to legitimise. Drivers are 
very conscious about these deviations as proven by their concealment of own illegitimate deviations 
in social relationships. The concealments can be seen as an expression of a systematically distorted 
communication that complicates the conditions of the communicative action. 
Moral Norms as a Regulator in Traffic Interactions 
Moral norms ability to regulate actions in traffic depends on drivers’ use of communicative action 
to explicate and enforce established norms. If the moral norms should be able to serve as a 
regulating factor in the traffic culture, the conditions of the communicative action must be 
favourable. At first sight I expected that the conditions for communication in traffic would be 
complicated by the anonymous relations and the transient interaction. There is actually a certain 
ambiguity in the communication in traffic due to the fact that often drivers who use legitimising 
techniques in reference to their own actions perceive others similar actions as motivated by 
egocentrism.  
 
In spite of the fact that the communication in traffic can be ambiguous, the automobile 
communication of moral norms seems to be very well developed in late modernity. The drivers 
have achieved skills in communicating through windows and mirrors, using brakes and lights as 
well as their own body to communicate with. Consequently, the car has become a material 
communication devise. It finds its expression when drivers use their own body and the lights of the 
automobile to apologize for illegitimate deviations and also in the case when other drivers violate 
moral standards. If this happens drivers use breaks, lights or sounds one’s horn slightly. The 
driver’s own body is used as well in the communication which in the case of others attempt to jump 
the queue can be done by putting blinkers on and ignoring the drivers request to get ahead or even 
make an angry stare at the driver to tell the person concerned that his or her actions is unacceptable. 
These types of automobile communications are used to explicate the moral standards in the traffic 
culture and are a way of maintaining social order.  
 
However, the drivers’ use of automobile communication is not necessarily a benefit for traffic 
safety: sometimes drivers legitimise actions morally that in an objective sense increases the risk of 
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 traffic accidents. This is the case when sanctioning others slow driving by violating the safety 
distances required by law is legitimised (primarily by male drivers). The violation might be 
legitimised morally, but it can not rescue the drivers involved from the objective risk.  
What Regulates What? 
As mentioned above, the relation between law and morality is quite complex and the question is: 
what is actually regulating drivers’ behaviour – the highway traffic code or the moral norms? In 
2006, a driving licence point demerit system was introduced in Denmark, and according to the 
Danish police it has decreased reckless driving. This system is an example of how intensified legal 
sanctions can be instrumental in changing drivers’ behaviour. But does the intensification of legal 
sanctions function due to the intensification of sanctions or is it because the sanctions conform to 
drivers moral standards?  
 
In order to answer that question it is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of drivers 
because the change in behaviour for some drivers can be a result of the fact that the driving licence 
point demerit system in its outermost consequence removes the driver’s opportunity for mobility 
and even the threat of that is enough to make drivers behave. For other drivers it can also be the 
intense moral debate in the media and population that followed in the wake of the change in 
legislation that has served as a reminder of how one ought to act according to moral standards, 
because many of the actions that release a strike in the driver’s license is also morally unacceptable 
among drivers. The fierce moral debate about the driving licence point demerit system can easily be 
as plausible a reason for drivers changing their behaviour as the intensification of legal sanctions in 
itself. 
   
Surely, if the highway traffic code should be able to effect drivers’ behaviour it is necessary that 
there is a power of cohesion with drivers’ moral praxis. This is brought into focus in the light of the 
raise of legal speed limits on freeways in Denmark, where the drivers’ moral praxis deviated too 
much from the legal standards. In order to accommodate the actual traffic culture the speed limits 
were raised. The raise resulted in a lot of criticism, because it was expected to increase the 
probability of accidents occurring because of higher speed. The actual result was the opposite. The 
average speed has decreased, car traffic glides better and the statistics show that the number of 
accidents has been decreased.  
 
Another example is the legal standards related to two lanes narrowing down to one, where the legal 
standards conflict with basic coping strategies such as the principle of equality and the first-served 
basis. Because of that the law cannot regulate drivers’ behaviour adequately. One conclusion could 
be that in order for the highway code to regulate driver behaviour, the law must be consistent with 
the drivers’ moral norms. But allowing the traffic culture to rule in this particular case is 
insufficient, because the drivers disregard of legal standards result in very long queues that 
constrain every one’s mobility. It seems that we have to choose between cholera and the plague. 
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 The optimal solution would probably be to abolish the existing legal standard and seek out other 
ways of legal regulation that does not conflict with basic moral coping strategies.   
The trouble is that it is not possible to conclude definitely what regulate different drivers’ strategies 
for action. Therefore, further studies are needed so that it becomes evident what really regulates 
driver behaviour. This can be done by identifying more clearly what and who is determining the 
regulating norms in traffic and how drivers actually act in traffic interactions. The ones who 
determine the moral standard is not necessarily the one’s capable of getting their way in the actual 
interaction. Maybe the illegitimate deviants are more successful in getting their way due to the fact 
that other drivers yield to the illegitimate deviant driver in order to avoid an accident? Further 
research has to provide more detailed answers to that question. 
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